

VZCZCXRO4232
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1452 2901408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171408Z OCT 06 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2698
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 001452

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED PARA MARKINGS)

DEPT FOR ISN, EAP, IO, AND EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [KN](#) [IR](#) [UN](#) [BU](#)
SUBJECT: BULGARIA SCOLDS NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR, SUMMONS
IRANIAN

REF: A. STATE 169418
[1](#)B. STATE 172816
[1](#)C. SOFIA 1431

Classified By: DCM Alex Karagiannis, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) On October 13, DCM met with Deputy Foreign Minister Feim Chaushev to follow up on reftel A demarche. Chaushev emphasized Bulgaria's strong reaction to the test, pointing out that he had summoned North Korean Ambassador Jo Song Ju to his office to express his displeasure. In Chaushev's words, the North Korean Ambassador seemed frightened by the test and its consequences, quietly noting Chaushev's remarks and promising to relay them to Pyongyang before meekly extending an invitation to visit North Korea.

[1](#)2. (C) According to Chaushev, the Bulgarian policy on North Korea tracks closely to that of the United States, and he promised to continue "close coordination" with us as this policy evolves. He stressed that North Korea should pay a price for its actions, as states such as Iran were watching the situation carefully and would be emboldened by perceived weakness on the part of the international community. To that end, Chaushev told us, he had taken the unprecedented step of summoning the Iranian Ambassador to his office in the wake of the North Korean test to underscore that similar steps by Iran would not bode well for the bilateral relationship.

[1](#)3. (C) At the same time, Chaushev argued that the isolation of North Korea should not be total. He listed a number of possible sanctions that the EU could discuss at its (then) upcoming GAERC meeting, including:
-A visa ban on North Korean scientific and technical personnel,
-Withdrawing EU ambassadors from North Korea,
-A partial embargo on trade with North Korea, and;
-Summoning the North Korean Foreign Minister to Brussels to express the EU's displeasure.

[1](#)4. (C) COMMENT: The GOB is strongly on board with our North Korea policy, and Chaushev deserves credit for his proactive decision to address his concern to the Iranian Embassy as well as North Korean representatives. After EU accession on January 1, 2007, we expect Bulgaria to become a strong voice for a tough common policy on North Korea, though it will also be subject to EU consensus-making procedures. END COMMENT.

[1](#)5. (U) We delivered reftel B talking points to the MFA on October 17, and will report any substantive response septel.

BEYRLE